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ABSTRAK
Komunitas Ahmadiyah di Indonesia telah mengalami peningkatan pelanggaran atas kebebasan 
beragama mereka dalam berbagai bentuk selama sepuluh tahun terakhir.  Terbukanya demokrasi pada 
tahun 1998 mengakibatkan keterlibatan ”aktor-aktor non negara” dalam kekerasan agama. Meskipun 
terjadi peningkatan serangan terhadap komunitas Ahmadiyah, negara enggan untuk mencegah 
atau menghukum serangan agama terhadap komunitas Ahmadiyah. Tulisan ini menyatakan bahwa 
kekerasan terhadap Ahmadiyah berada dalam bahaya yang menjadi sah terlegitimasi.
Kata kunci: Ahmadiyah, FPI, Legitimasi Kekerasan, Patronase Negara, Desentralisasi
ABSTRACT
The Ahmadiyah community in Indonesia has experienced increasing infringement on their religious 
freedom in various forms during the last ten years. The opening up of democracy in 1998 resulted 
in the involvement of “non state actors “in religious violence. Despite increasing attacks against the 
Ahmadiyah community, the state has been reluctant to prevent or punish religious attacks against the 
Ahmadiyah community. In this article I argue that violence against the Ahmadiyah is in danger of 
becoming legitimate.
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166
Kawistara, Vol. 3, No. 2, Agustus 2013: 165-177
INTRODUCTION
This paper discusses on multiple causes 
for attacks and discrimination against the 
Ahmadiyah community in Indonesia. Attacks 
are not only directed against Ahmadiyah 
followers, but also on their mosques and 
homes. It also investigates the response of 
the state to violence against the Ahamdiyah 
community. There have been numerous articles 
about the religious freedom of the Ahmadiyah 
community in Indonesia. Many of these 
articles have mainly focused on laws and law 
enforcement in Indonesia. However, this paper 
that attacks on the Ahmadiyah community are 
more complex and caused by multiple factors. 
West Java is one of the hotspot for attacks 
on the Ahmadiyah community. This ?eld 
research was conducted in West Java and use 
examples from West. The interviews were 
conducted in different Islamists in Cirebon 
as well as members of the Ahmadiyah 
community in Bekasi. It discusses on what 
degree the state facilitates religious attacks 
against the Ahmadiyah community in 
Indonesia. One issue is the misuse of laws and 
regulations as a way of discriminating against 
the Ahmadiyah community. The Indonesian 
state is about to lose control over its legitimate 
use of violence by allowing vigilant groups to 
harass the Ahmadiyah community.  
It also discusses on how the attackers 
retain a certain degree of legitimacy of the 
violence they commit. There may not only be 
theological/ideological reasons for the attacks. 
Changes are unlikely to occur unless we see 
fundamental economic, social, political and 
legal reforms in Indonesia. The multiple causes 
on why violence against the Ahmadiyah may 
seem to become”legitimate” in Indonesia. It 
uses the de?nition of “legitimate” as described 
by Charles Tilly as “the probability that other 
authorities are likely to con?rm the decision of 
a given authority (Tilly, 1985: 169-191).
DISCUSSION
Ahmadiyah Community in Indonesia: 
Who are They?
The Ahmadiyya movement was 
founded in 1889 in Kadiani, India by Mirza 
Ghulam Ahmad. Ahmadiyya is normally 
seen as a deviant sect of Islam by mainstream 
Muslims. While the Ahmadiyyas consider 
themselves Muslims, many conventional 
Muslims do not consider them as such.  In 
Indonesia, the Ahmadiyya group is divided 
into Ahmadiyya Muslim Community (JAI) and 
the smaller Lahore Ahmadiyya Movement for 
the Propagation of Islam (GAI). The GAI is seen 
as a more moderate branch of Ahmadiyya, 
where they see Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a 
mere reformer of Islam. On the other hand JAI 
believes that Mirza Ghulam Ahmad himself 
was a Prophet, and that he was the promised 
Messiah and the Mahdi. To claim that 
Muhammad was not the last prophet is highly 
controversial and seen as unacceptable by 
mainstream and orthodox Muslims (Colbran, 
2000). Within the Indonesian context, the 
entire Ahmadiyya movement encompasses 
some 400 000 members.
There have been several attacks on the 
Ahmadiyya community in Indonesia, by 
non-state actors, especially by some Islamist 
groups. One interesting aspect is that the 
violence against the Ahmadiyya community 
is a fairly recent occurrence. The Ahmadiyyas 
lived relatively peacefully with their Muslim 
counterparts after they arrived in Indonesia in 
the 1920s.  However, since the Independence 
of Indonesia in December 1949 Islamists 
were heavily suppressed during the two 
dictatorships.  This changed in 1998, when 
Indonesia experienced increased political 
liberalization and transition to democracy. 
As a consequence, increased political space 
has seen a ?ourishing of civil society groups 
in Indonesia. Thus, even though most civil 
society groups are advocates of democracy 
and human rights, some groups are illiberal 
and have a negative attitude to the promotion 
of human rights. Political liberalization has 
thus, somewhat paradoxically, given Islamist 
groups leverage (Colbran, 2000).
Who are the Islamists?
Even though the Ahmadiyah community 
is seen as a controversial deviant sect by large 
segments of the population, the violence is 
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nevertheless almost exclusively committed 
by Islamists. An Islamist is a proponent of 
Islamism, and Olivier Roy gives the following 
de?nition of Islamism Islamism is the brand of 
modern political Islamic fundamentalism that 
claims to re-create a true Islamic society, not 
simply by imposing sharia, but by establishing 
??????? ??? ???????? ?????? ???????? ?????????? ????????
Islamists see Islam not as a mere religion, but as a 
political ideology that should reshape all aspects of 
society (politics, law, economy, social justice, and 
foreign policy and so on (Roy, 2004: 247). 
One of the most prominent groups is 
the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI). FPI was 
founded by Misbahul Anam, a Nahdatul 
Ulama-educated preacher, and Habib Rizieq, 
a habib (an Islamic preacher tracing familial 
descent from the Prophet Muhammad) 
of mixed Arab-Betawi descent. While the 
leadership of the FPI consists of Muslim 
scholars, rank members are usually poor 
urban youth (Wilson, 2005). The membership 
is increasing rapidly. By 2005 the FPI had 
over hundred thousand members. Since 
the FPI is the most prominent group, there 
are examples from the FPI in this apaper. 
Interviews were conducted with several 
regional Islamists groups in Cirebon, (West 
Java), such as Gerakan Muslim Penyelamat 
Akidah (Gempa), Gerakan Anti-Pemurtadan 
dan Anti Aliran Sesat (Gapas), Pagar Akidah 
(Faith Fence), and Cirebon Muslim Movement 
(GMC). Common to all these groups is their 
commitment to implementing sharia law in 
Indonesia and the puri?cation of Islam.  
What distinguishes these groups from other 
Islamist parties and Islamist organizations 
is their tendency to use violence. Hence, it is 
important to emphasize that most Islamist 
groups and organizations do not engage in 
violent activities. Even though Nahdatul 
Ulama is considered a conservative Islamist 
organization, it nevertheless condemns 
violent attacks on Ahmadiyahs.  However, 
the groups that do engage in violence, 
legitimatize the violence by claiming to 
be moral agents, acting on behalf of the 
state which is too weak to crack down on 
vice and immorality. The Islamists target 
Ahmadiyahs, nightclubs, brothels and liberal 
Muslims.  The leader of Gapas, Andi Mulya 
argues: “Gapas just documents vice and 
blashemic activities and only takes action 
when the police fail to act” (New ?ork Times, 
2001). These Islamists have been criticized 
for being thugs or “criminals/preman in 
disguise”using simplistic religious symbols 
to legitimatize violence. The Islamists have 
nevertheless been able to make elite alliances, 
thus posing a security threat in Indonesia 
(Abuza, 2007). 
The Indonesian State’s Response to 
Religious Violence
The Legal Framework of Religious 
Freedom in Indonesia
This section discusses on what degree 
laws in Indonesia facilitate or prevent 
violence against the Ahamdiayh community. 
The Constitution of Indonesia is the superior 
legal source in Indonesia.  In the preamble of 
the Constitution is the Pancasila which means 
“?ve pillars” and describes the ideological 
foundation of Indonesia. The ?rst pillar is the 
belief in the one and only God. Historically, 
the pillar was made as a compromise between 
followers of an Islamic state and seculars 
(Tomte, 2012). Thus, although Indonesia is 
not an Islamic state, it is not a secular, but a 
religious state. As will be discussed later in 
this section, the Pancasila sets the framework 
for the Indonesian interpretation of religious 
freedom. Freedom of religion is ensured in 
the Indonesian constitution of 1945. 
After the transition to democracy in 
1998, the constitution was amended and 
a human right chapter was included. Art. 
28E in the human rights chapter guarantees 
everyone the freedom of religion. The 
Human Rights Act was passed in 1999 and 
religious freedom was ensured, similarly to 
that in the constitution. Indonesia rati?ed 
the International Convention on Civil and 
Political Rights in 2005. This means that 
the state has a duty to protect, ful?ll and 
respect freedom of religion for its citizens. 
Religious freedom as described in art. 18 
in the convention encompass both internal 
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religious freedom and external religious 
freedom.  
There are no limitations to internal 
religious freedom; everyone is entitled to have 
their own belief, or not to believe. External 
religious freedom encompasses freedom 
of worship, form religious associations, et 
cetera. There are certain limitations to external 
religious freedom but such limitations are 
only allowed under severe circumstances 
(General comments art 18, ICCPR). According 
to art.18 (3), limitations are only allowed if the 
limitation is prescribed by law, and secondly 
in order to protect public safety, public order, 
health, morals or the fundamental freedom 
of others. Furthermore, limitations must be 
proportionate to the need indicated and must 
not be imposed in a discriminatory manner 
or for discriminatory purposes. Further, if 
a citizen’s freedom of religion is violated, 
he/she has the right to an effective remedy 
through a court proceeding.
The normative human rights framework 
for the protection of religious freedom seems 
strong in Indonesia. However, to ensure 
religious freedom in Indonesia it is also 
important that other laws are consistent 
with the ICCPR and the constitution. The 
following will discuss on laws which were 
issued prior to the transition to democracy in 
1998. I argue that these laws are inconsistent 
with religious freedom as set out in the 
constitution and the ICCPR.
Blashemphy Law
The blasphemy law (1965) describes the 
religions adhered to in Indonesia, which are: 
Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism, 
Hinduism and Confucianism. At the same 
time it claims that other religions are not 
prohibited in Indonesia. However, the law 
has been interpreted in such a way that only 
the six religions, including the two versions 
of Christianity are recognized in Indonesia. 
Moreover, deviant interpretations and activities 
of the core religious teachings are seen as 
blasphemous and hence prohibited. The penal 
code art.15.6a criminalizes defamation and 
misuse of one of the of?cial religions.  
In essence, the blasphemy law is there 
to prevent hatred and incitement to violence 
against religious groups. However, a law 
concerning the defamation of a religion may 
be problematic, because it may serve as an 
incentive for the state or non-state actors to 
accuse individuals for defamation of religion, 
just because they belong to another religion, 
or more precisely: deviate from one of the 
of?cial religions (Colbran, 2010). Hence, the 
law concerning defamation of religion and 
penal code of 156a does not protect religious 
minorities from discrimination. Moreover, 
the laws allow religious minorities to be 
prosecuted for defamation, because their 
core religious teachings deviate from one of 
the “six recognized religions.” 
Under increasing pressure from Islamists 
to ban JAI (which is the main Ahmadiyah 
sect), the government announced in 2008 
the Joint Decree Letter, which was based 
on the blashemy law (The joint ministeal 
decree, 2008). The letter declared that all 
Ahmadiyahs who claim to be Muslims must 
cease all dissemination of interpretation 
which is deviant from the mainstream 
interpretation of Islam. The Ahmadiyhas had 
two options; either to conform to mainstream 
Islam teachings or declare themselves Non-
Muslims. Neither of these alternatives was 
appealing to the Ahmadiyahs. If they did 
not follow these requirements, they risked 
being punished under the penal code 156a 
(Colbran, 2010). The law did not outright ban 
the Ahmadiyah community, but was more of 
a warning to the Ahmadiyah`s. However, as 
seen in the next sections the joint decree has 
been unlawfully used by local governments 
to issue similarly decrees in their local 
communities.  
In 2009-2010 the blasphemy law was 
challenged at the constitutional court in 
Indonesia for being unconstitutional. The 
petitioners claimed that “the blasphemy law`s” 
prohibition of religious activities which deviate 
from the core teachings of a religion violated 
religious freedom set out in the constitution. 
They further claimed that the law violated 
the internal dimension of religion, since 
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it prohibits deviant interpretation of core 
religious teachings. However, despite strong 
human rights arguments against the law, 
the court declared it constitutional (though 
with recommendations to make it clearer and 
ensure non-discriminatory law enforcement). 
The court emphasized the importance of 
maintaining public order and ensuring religious 
harmony. They argued that deviant religious 
activities and defamation might provoke 
and disturb public order and create religious 
tensions. Hence, the law was necessary in 
order to prevent violence and ensure religious 
harmony, which is an important feature of 
Javanese culture (Tomte, 2012). 
The Indonesian interpretation of 
religious freedom was evident in the court 
ruling. The court referred to Pancasila, and 
claimed that deviant activities leading people 
away from God could not be accepted. They 
also emphasized the “rights of others” which 
included the right of others or communities 
not to be insulted from deviant religious 
activities. Hence a community right not to 
be offended was superior to an individual’s 
freedom of religion. Some elements of 
the court ruling seems problematic and 
unjusti?able from a human rights perspective. 
First of all, as described, Indonesia is a 
state party to the ICCPR and is obliged to 
follow its obligations. The ICCPR mentions 
the communitarian aspect of freedom of 
religion, but not that it is superior to the 
individual aspect of religious freedom. 
Hence, the court ruling did not meet its 
international human rights obligations, 
which is a case of concern.The fact that the 
law was necessary in order to avoid religious 
violence is also highly questionable. Quite 
the contrary, the law may give violent actors 
more legitimate reasons to attack deviant 
minority groups such as the Ahmadiyahs. It 
is evident, especially after the Joint Decree 
Letter which is based on the blasphemy law 
that violence against the Ahmadiya has has 
increased (Setara Institute, 2009). 
Hence, through the blashemy law and the 
Joint Decree Letter of 2008 the state facilitates 
indirectly and directly violence against the 
Ahmadiyah community. Indirectly through 
laws and regulations which do not fully 
protect the Ahmadiyahs in line with other 
“recognized” religions, and directly through 
the Joint Letter Decree 2008 which stimulated 
increased discrimination and attacks on the 
Ahmadiyah community. Laws and decrees 
is one of the many factors which contribute 
to increasing “legitimization of violence” 
against the Ahmadiyah community. 
Democratization of Legitimate Use 
of Violence in the Post New Order/ 
Reformasi
This section explores on the Indonesian 
government response to violence against 
the Ahmadiyah community. It argues that 
the fragmented Indonesian state is giving 
vigilant groups such as Islamists’ legitimacy 
in using violence. According to Max Weber 
(1919), it is only the state that should have 
the legitimate power to use violence. Hence, 
other non- state actors` use of violence is 
not legitimate. According to Ian Wilson, 
FPI and other Islamist violent actions seem 
nevertheless to have some legitimacy in 
Indonesia and thus threatens Weber’ s 
perception on the state as the only holding of 
legitimate power of violence (Wilson, 2005). 
The reason for this is related to 
Indonesia’s transition from an authoritarian 
to a democratic, but fragmented state. As 
mentioned there have been several attacks 
on Ahmadiyya and attacks on their mosque. 
The state, some local governments and the 
police have been criticized for not being 
able or willing to prevent or punish attacks 
from Islamists. In many instances the police 
have been at the crime scene, but not done 
anything in preventing attacks. Punishments 
for the attacks have been lenient and very 
low.The inability or unwillingness of the 
state to systematically crack down on the 
vigilant groups has provided them with 
legitimacy.Wilson argues that the reasons 
why these groups seem to be given impunity 
are complex.
First of all, the vigilant groups justify 
their actions by claiming to act on behalf of a 
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weak and fragmented state. This is because the 
state is not able to provide adequate services 
such as protection, justice and employment. 
Moreover, the vigilant groups are justifying 
the violence through religious symbolism 
and by propagating morality in society. This 
has given these groups more legitimacy, 
and cracking down on them is seen as more 
problematic. Wilson further argues that one 
of the reasons why the government and the 
state institutions are unwilling or unable to 
prevent religious attacks is because of its“on- 
and off” alliances with the Islamists. During 
the dictatorship under Suharto from 1966 to 
1998, referred to as the new order period, the 
state had monopoly on violence. The state 
apparatus was working as a patron for the 
different vigilant groups, and used them as 
“assistants” for “regime maintenance”.There 
was little room for violence which was not 
sanctioned by the state. According to Wilson, 
as a consequence of democratization and 
decentralization in 1998, a privatization of 
violence has been occurring in the post new 
order. Different vigilant groups are able to 
operate relatively freely as they have found 
other patrons/clients than the state (Wilson, 
2005). 
Wilson (2005) argues that the post new 
order period can be characterized as partial 
patronage. Sometimes vigilant groups make 
alliances with politicians, military, the police 
and the business elite, but these alliances are 
only temporary. This partial patronage has 
been bene?cial for the fragmented political 
elite to gain economic or political power. 
He further argues that these groups have 
been used by the military and political elite 
to intimidate more progressive political and 
social elements of society. A Wikileaks report 
con?rmed that also the police enjoyed close 
connections with Islamists (Jakarta Globe, 
2011). 
The police used the FPI as a tool, 
which would exempt them from criticism 
from human rights violations. However, 
these connections were also bene?cial for 
the vigilant groups. Wilson argues that the 
temporary patronage has allowed the vigilant 
groups to operate with a certain degree of 
impunity and gain political leverage for 
controversial agendas.?enny Wahid, the 
daughter of former President Abdurrahman 
Wahid (Gus Dur) stated even more strongly 
that the security forces that had helped form 
and ?nance FPI had created a monster that 
worked completely independently. Anyone 
could hire FPI for political purposes, but 
no one can control the leader Habib Rizieq 
(Jakarta Globe, 2012). 
Since the state is so weak and 
fragmented, other actors have thus also 
sought control over the legitimate use of 
violence. Moreover, since some political 
and economic elites see the vigilant groups 
as a bene?cial and extremely useful tool for 
political opportunism they are reluctant to 
crackdown on the vigilant groups. We can 
see these close connections in the case of 
West Java which will be described in more 
detail in the next section. 
The Importance of Local Politics: The 
Case of West Java
This section uses on the case of West 
Java to illustrate how laws/decrees and political 
patronage as previously discussed, contribute 
to the legitimization of violence against the 
Ahmadiyah community. Hence, it is worth 
to mention that the case of West Java is the 
hotspot for violence against the Ahmadiyah 
community. In other provinces the police and 
the government have been more successful in 
preventing violence against the Ahmadiyah 
community. In 2011 three members of the 
Ahmadiyah community were beaten to death 
by a mob of about 1000 people in Cikeusik 
village. Only12 men were punished, viz. 
a lenient punishment of about three to six 
months.More importantly, one of the victims, 
an Ahmadiyah was also sentenced to jail for 
provoking the attacks and disturbing public 
order. He received the same punishment as 
the men who had killed the Ahmadiyyas. 
Police inspector Hasanuddin testi?ed in 
the court, and emphasized that it was the 
Ahmadiyah as themselves who provoked the 
deadly killings by refusing to leave the house 
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where they had been gathered (Human 
Right Reports, 2013). There have since then 
been several attacks on the Ahmadiyas and 
mosques in West Java.  
After the transition to democracy in 
1998, Indonesia has become increasingly 
decentralized, thus transferring power 
from the central government to the local 
governments. Decentralization was seen as 
a positive step in the sense that devolution 
of power was delegated to impoverished 
provinces outside the economic and political 
hub of Jakarta. However, it is claimed that 
decentralization has had a deteriorating 
effect on religious minorities, especially in 
West Java (Human Rights Reports, 2013). 
Laws and Decrees
“The Joint Letter Ministerial Decree 
of 2008”, which was a warning to the 
Ahmadiyahas, but not an outright ban, led 
to the encouragement of local governments 
and regencies to issue similar decrees in their 
respective provinces.  For instance, Islamists 
pressured the mayor in Bekasi (which is the 
regency in West Java) Rahmat Effendi, to issue 
a similar anti-Ahmadiyah mayor regulation 
(Mayor regulation no.40, year, 2011 on 
“Banningahmadiyahactivities in Bekasi 
City”). Moreover, the mayor regulation has 
led Islamists to interpret the regulationas 
a complete ban on the Ahmadiyahs, and 
has pressured the regency to enforce the 
regulation. The recent occurrence in the 
Al Misbah mosque in Bekasi inWest Java 
illustrates this. The mosque has been sealed 
since April ?fth, and at the time of writing 
there are still 18 people inside the mosque 
protesting against the sealingof the mosque. 
The closure prevents Ahmadiyahas from 
worshiping in the mosque. The sealing 
of the mosque was conducted by the 
mayor in Bekasi and local police of?cers. 
However, evidence suggests that the day 
before the sealing, FPI members came to 
the governmental of?ce pressuring the 
government to enforce the mayor regulation 
or they would attack the mosque (Interview 
woth the Ahmadiyah leader in Bekasi). The 
fact that the mayor yielded to pressure from 
the FPI indicates that the group has some 
legitimacy. Most importantly, the mayor-
regulation gives the Islamists legitimating to 
pursue the Ahmadiyah community.  
Ujang, the chairman of the Islamists 
group, Gempa, in West Java, emphasizes that 
the Islamists are just enforcing the laws. He 
says:  “Religious violence occurred because 
the government failed to produce ?rm 
actions.  The provincial government needs to 
demolish Ahmadiyah buildings in West Java 
province by using Governor Decree 2011, 
because the buildings violated provincial 
bylaws. In order to arrest the perpetrators, 
namely those who still de?antly do prayer 
in the sealed mosques, the police need to 
use Criminal Code Article 156a on religious 
blasphemy. So, this is clear. The chief problem 
is government performance in enforcement 
of law” (Interviews with Ujang, Chairman of 
Gempa).
Hence, laws and decrees seem to give 
added legitimacy for violence towards the 
Ahmadiyah community. This is in line with 
research conducted by the SETARA institute 
(2009) which con?rms that violence towards 
the Ahmadiyah community has increased 
since the adoption of the different anti-
Ahmadiyah decrees/regulations. There are 
some problems relating to the provincial/
mayor decrees. According to law 10 (3) 
2004 (the law of the Republic of Indonesia 
Number 32, year 2004) concerning regional 
administration, religious affairs are within 
the jurisdiction of the central government, 
and not the local government. However, as 
in the case of West Java, different factors 
have contributed to religious freedom 
becoming a de facto local affair. For instance, 
another controversial decree is the highly 
controversial “Joint Ministerial Decree on the 
construction of houses of Worship 2006”. 
This decree requires permission from 
local authorities and consent from other 
religious communities to allow the building 
of houses of worship. This is problematic, 
since it should be a central government 
domain, but it also sets minority groups in 
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a vulnerable position, because the building 
permissions depend on the consent of 
majority religious groups. Thus, through 
“the anti-Ahmadiyah regulations” and the 
“decree on houses of worship”, religious 
affairs become de facto a local affair.
The Ahmadiyah community has now 
submitted a complaint to the court in 
Bandung. The Ahmadiyah leader Basit is 
suing the mayor for the closing of the mosque 
and for violating the joint ministerial decree 
of 2008. The court ruling will be important 
in determining religious freedom of the 
Ahmadiyah community in Bekasi, because 
a victory may force the local government 
to accommodate for minority groups. 
However, recent history illustrates that 
the regency in Bekasi has not always taken 
into consideration the rule of law and has 
gone beyond their power as regency. HKBP 
Filadel?a has been waiting for ?ve years to 
gain permission to build a church in Bekasi 
district after submitting an application in 
2007. The Supreme Court ruled that the 
HKBP Fildale?a should get a building permit 
to build a church. However, the court ruling 
has not been taken into consideration by the 
district administration, which still does not 
allow the building of a church (Ucanews.com, 
2012). The fact that the central government 
has not intervened in any way to ensure 
worship permission for HKBP leaves the 
local government with enhanced powers 
which goes beyond their mandate. 
Religious freedom should be a central 
government concern, but by ignoring local 
religious disputes, the State is legitimizing 
violence against the Ahmadiyah community 
or other minority groups. Moreover, the 
provincial anti-Ahmadiyah decrees have 
given the Islamists legitimization to pursue the 
Ahmadiyah community to enforce the decrees. 
Political Patronage
The governor in West Java who belongs 
to the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) has been 
criticized for being too lenient in preventing 
violence or infringement of religious 
freedom in West Java. It is speculated that the 
local governor in West Java enjoyed partial 
relations with the FPI and other radicals 
in West Java, and that they signed a deal 
agreeing on banning all the activities of the 
Ahmadiyahs in West Java.  In return the hard 
liners would gather political support to the 
governor. Thus the Islamists seek political 
patronage from politicians who are willing 
to make alliances (Jakarta Globe, 2013).
The PKS is an Islamist Conservative 
Party, but it is argued that the connections 
with the FPI are more pragmatic than 
theological. West Java has a history of 
Islamism which is evident in the society 
today as well. Robin Bush argues that history 
and local culture play an important factor in 
determining local politics. West Java has a 
recent history of Islamism, where the Islamist 
secessionist movement “Darul Islam” ?rst 
originated. The movement was critical to the 
new independent republic in the late 1940s, 
and promoted an Islamic state.   Bush argues 
that these regions which supported an 
Islamist secessionist movement in the 1940s 
are also more positive to Islamist related laws 
such as Sharia by-laws (Bush, 2008). Drawing 
from this, one may argue that restrictive 
Ahmadiyah regulations may attract more 
voters in more “Islamist-oriented regions”, 
such as west Java.
By-laws banning Ahmadiyahs or 
preventing them from worshipping are 
unconstitutional and should be the concern 
of the central government. Azyumardi Azra, 
a prominent Muslim scholar and director 
of the graduate school at the State Islamic 
University in Jakarta argues that the central 
government and President ?udhoyono do not 
have the political will to force the governors 
or the mayors to respect the different laws and 
court rulings in for instance Bekasi (The New 
?orks Times, 2013). Bonar Tigor Naipospos, 
vice chairman from the Setara Institute 
argues that Mr. ?udhoyono has used the 
religious card to get political support from 
conservative Muslim groups and Islamist 
based political parties.  Even though the 
President in principle has a commitment to 
plurality, his dependency on Islamist groups 
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has made him reluctant to clamp down on 
religious attacks and discrimination. Thus, a 
harder crackdown on attacks on Ahmadiyah 
may lead to less political support and votes. 
Abuza argues however that politicians may 
have overestimated the Islamists strength, 
which is not as widespread as perceived. 
Most Muslims are moderate, while only a 
small percentage is considered Islamists 
(Abuza, 2007).
In summary, decentralization has had 
some unfortunate effects in Indonesia, in 
terms of religious freedom, especially in 
West Java. First of all, the different regencies 
are misusing laws and decrees to ban the 
Ahmadiyah community, which in turn 
encourages violent attacks by the Islamists. 
Moreover, alliances between the Islamists 
and the local political elite may give the 
Islamists impunity for their actions. A 
critical factor is that the central government 
is outright ignoring religious attacks and 
discrimination against the Ahmadiyah 
community in West Java. These factors 
contribute to the legitimatizing of violence 
against the Ahmadiyah community. 
The Islamists: Causes for Violence
Theological Causes for Violence
This section discusses on how the 
Islamists gain a certain degree of legitimacy 
in their use of violence. Indonesia is a 
predominantly Muslim society, with an 87, 
2% Muslim population. As mentioned most 
Muslims are moderate, with only 19% being 
referred to as Islamists. This group is diverse 
with different interests and priorities. Some 
belongs to political parties; some belongs to 
Islamist organizations and some to violent 
radical organizations such as the FPI (Weck, 
Noorhaidi, and Irfan, 2011). In this context, the 
Islamists’ emphasis on the ????????????of Islam 
is of great signi?cance. Their goal is to purify 
Islam from any impurities such as Western 
thought, and even worse- post- prophetic 
interpretations from the inside. Thus while 
many minority groups are targets of vigilant 
Islamist groups, the Ahmadiyah community 
is seen as extremely controversial. Not only 
do the religious teachings of the Ahmadiyahs 
deviate from the core teachings of Islam, 
but they nevertheless claim to be Muslims 
and they are thus seen to be attacking Islam 
from within. In the past few years, Indonesia 
has seen the rise of public condemnation of 
”Tak?ri” (apostates and deviants).  These 
condemnations have come in the form of 
fatwas from the quasi-of?cial Ulamas Council 
of Indonesia (MUI). The fatwa states that the 
group is heretical and deviant. Abuza argues 
that while these fatwas do not have any legal 
bearing, they have been used as a justi?cation 
for violent attacks (Abuza, 2007).
In an interview with Andi, the leader 
of an Islamist organization named Gapas, 
he con?rmed the controversial nature of the 
Ahmadiyahs
When you mention whether the violent protest 
or religious violence was legitimate or not, we 
felt that our actions were legitimate. We told 
the Ahmadiyah people that if they claim to be 
Muslims, then they have to be the right Muslims. 
If they are not willing to implement Islamic 
tenets, don’t use Islam as the name of their 
religion. Usually, they resisted our protests, and 
???????????????????????????????????????
Hamdan from another Islamist organization 
called Pagar Akidah argued:
If the Ahmadiyah do not want to be attacked, do 
not want to be disturbed, they should establish 
their own religion. However, they claim to be 
Muslims, they claim their holy book is Al Quran, 
but they acknowledge additional verses. The 
prophet is not only Muhammad, but in addition 
to Muhammad, there is Mirza Ghulam Ahmad. 
We are really offended. If they name their religion 
other than Islam, the problem is over. In Islam, 
there is no religious sentiment.  Ahmadiyah is 
established to destroy Islam from within. They 
are not able to overcome Islam when they meet 
Islam head to head, therefore they strike from 
within. We consider them non-Muslims who 
wish to destroy Islam from within. 
Hence, it is evident that the Ahmadiyahs 
are controversial from a theological point of 
view. However, theological reasons may also 
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work as a shield for secular reasons, as we 
will see in the next section. 
Theological Reasons May Work as a 
Shield for Secular Reasons 
There have been numerous articles 
about the theological and legal reasons for the 
attacks against the Ahmadiyah community. 
However, there has been limited research on 
secular or economic factors for the attacks. 
Wilson argues that criminal acts by Islamists 
may seem more legitimate when the 
motives are religious. Since the Ahmadiyah 
community in general is quite controversial, 
attacking Ahmadiyahas or infringing their 
religious freedom may seem more legitimate 
when using religious rhetoric. He argues that 
the characteristics of the Reformarsi Period 
are that criminal gangs or “premans” have 
essentially just changed into religious suits 
or clothes. In order to legitimize their actions 
they use religious symbols and religious 
rhetoric to shield secular reasons. 
In an interview with the Ahmadiyah 
leader in Bekasi, Rahmat Rahmaijaya argued 
that the attacks and discrimination against 
the Ahmadiyah community may be secular 
as well as theological. The Ahmadiyah 
community in most areas of Indonesia tends 
to be wealthier or have a higher economic 
income than the rest of the population. Unlike 
other Muslim organizations the Ahmadiyah 
community does not get any funding from 
the government, but is still able to sustain 
itself.  Indonesia has in the recent years 
experienced economic growth. However, 
economic growth has been coupled with 
inequality. Unemployment and poverty 
among the general population is evident in 
Indonesia. The relative deprivation theory is 
originally a social psychological theory, but 
has been developed in other social science 
disciplines to explain discrimination and 
violence towards groups (Pettigrew et al., 
2008).  This theory suggests that not poverty 
as such, but inequality can foster prejudice, 
discrimination and violence. The theory 
focuses on the feeling of deprivation due 
to economic comparisons with others. An 
individual or a group may feel deprived, 
when one feels worse off than its reference 
group in terms of economic income. 
Research indicates that it is particularly the 
collective aspect of deprivation which may 
lead to violence against the reference group 
(Pettigrew et al., 2008). In the case of the 
Ahmadiyah, violence may be a powerful 
motivator to reduce one’s feeling of economic 
deprivation. Hence economic deprivation or 
jealousy among the low-ranking members 
of the Islamist organizations, may serve as 
a reason for the attacks on the more af?uent 
Ahmadiyah community. In an interview 
conducted with the Lahore community (GAI) 
in ?ogyakarta they emphasized the economic 
dimension as a cause for violence.
JAI is a big organization, receiving oversea 
funding, and is economically successful. They are 
also very exclusivist in the sense that they have 
their own mosque, they allow other Muslims in 
their mosque, but they only allow the Ahmadiyah 
themselves to manage their own mosque. Other 
exclusivist practices include only marrying 
Ahmadiyahs, and living in exclusivist areas such 
as Manislor in West Java. 
Andi, the chairman of the Islamist 
group, Gapas, also stressed this and argued 
in the following way:
The second source of dispute is coming 
from within Ahmadiyah itself. They live by 
themselves. They don’t want to mingle with 
other communities. When Muslims would like 
to pray in their mosques, they don’t allow the 
Muslims to pray there. If the Muslims under 
certain circumstances are allowed to pray inside 
the mosques, the spot where Muslims conducted 
prayer is quickly cleaned up shortly after the 
prayer was done. So, they live by themselves. 
They maintain their exclusivity.
The JAI community, however, argues 
that this perception is false and that they do 
not wish to remain exclusivist, but policies 
and attacks by the government and the 
Islamist make them isolated from the rest of 
the population. Whether or not the exclusivist 
practice is voluntary or not, it does create a 
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situation where the Ahmadiyah community 
is segregated from the rest of the society.
A researcher on religious violence 
argues that the Ahmadiyah community can 
be compared with the Mormons in the United 
States or the Jews prior to Second World War. 
The Mormons are perceived as controversial 
both from a theological and socio-economic 
perspective. They are also exclusivist and 
somewhat segregated, but economically 
powerful. They have also been victims of 
discriminatory practices in the United States. 
The Jews were perceived as wealthy, and 
were being labeled scapegoats for poverty 
and high unemployment in Europe. Even 
though the violence committed against the 
Jews was of a much bigger dimension, there 
are similarities in terms of religious minority 
status and economic prosperity (Interview 
with a PhD candidate on religious who 
wishes to remain anonymous).
As discussed above, there may be secular 
reasons for attacking the Ahmadiyahs, but 
there may also be secular reasons for joining 
Islamist groups.  Sudirman Nasir argues that 
even though it is important to ensure ef?cient 
laws and law enforcement mechanisms, 
it is also extremely important to ensure 
employment and education opportunities for 
youth in Indonesia (Nasir, 2010). Research 
indicates that unemployment makes it 
more likely for youth to join radical violent 
organizations, because there are many non- 
material and material bene?ts joining an 
organization. First of all, material bene?ts 
can come in terms of money, food et cetera. 
Hence some might join Islamist organizations 
such as the FPI to get access to these goods.  
Nasir further argues that being 
unemployed may lead to a feeling of a loss 
of identity and loss of masculinity. Joining 
radical groups such as the FPI and other 
vigilant groups may in a non- conventional 
way give them a sense of belonging, a feeling 
of identity and increases their feeling of 
masculinity. Creating job and education 
opportunities may therefore be an important 
factor in combating violence against the 
Ahmadiyah community. Thus, it is important 
to view the Ahmadiyah question holistically 
in order to ?nd solutions to protect the 
Ahmadiyah community. Laws and law 
enforcement that protect the Ahmadiyah 
community is essential. Moreover, in 
order to reduce recruitment to Islamist 
organizations it is crucial to ensure social 
and economic rights. Hence, such efforts may 
reduce violence towards the Ahmadiyah 
despite theological disagreements among 
conventional Muslims.
CONCLUSION
Indonesia has a reputation for being 
a pluralistic nation promoting religious 
tolerance. Recently the President received 
a statesman award for promoting religious 
tolerance and pluralism in Indonesia. The 
award has however received massive criticism 
by human rights organizations. Indonesia 
is facing huge problems related to religious 
intolerance, especially towards religious 
minorities, and the government has not taken 
action against the violent vigilant groups.  As 
a matter of fact, violence towards Ahmadiyahs 
is in danger of becoming legitimate. 
As discussed in this article, the reason 
for violence towards the Ahmadiyah 
community is complex. The Indonesian state 
needs to regain its monopoly on violence, by 
ensuring security, justice and employment 
for the population as a whole. In that way, 
criminal gangs can no longer claim to 
act on behalf of a fragile and weak state. 
Increasing inequality and poverty is one of 
the major challenges facing Indonesia today. 
Creating job and working opportunities 
for Indonesians are extremely important in 
order to decrease recruitments to Islamist 
organization. These organizations are 
extremely attractive to unemployed youth, 
who use these organizations to recreate a 
sense of manhood and identity. Ef?cient 
laws and law- enforcement combined with 
economic and social reform is essential 
in preventing attacks and discrimination 
against the Ahmadiyah community. 
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INTERVIEWS
Interview with the Ahmadiyah leader Rahmat 
Rahmaijayain Bekasi conducted on 
13.06.2013
Interview with Andi, leader of the Islamists 
vigilant group “Gapas” conducted 
on 10.5.2013
Interview with Hamdan, leader of the Islamist 
group “Pagar Akidah” conducted on 
10.05.2013
Interview with Ujang, the Chairman of the 
Islamist group “Gempa” conducted 
on 10.05.2013
Interview with a PhD candidate on religious 
violence who wishes to remain 
anonymous conducted on 07.01.2013
Interview with the Lahore Community 
(GAI) in ?ogyakarta conducted on 
06.07.2013
Interview with JAI in ?ogyakarta conducted 
on 07.07.2013
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